Detecting Thid-party Addresses in Traceroute Traces with IP Timestamp Option

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Motivations

- An accurate knowledge of the Internet topology is essential for
  - network emulation and simulation
  - network management (e.g. fault isolation, anomaly detection, etc.)
  - service and resource allocation
  - modeling the Internet cartography

- BGP derived AS-level topologies are incomplete
  - using Traceroute may help to overcome such incompleteness
  - Traceroute is known to be potentially inaccurate!
Potential sources of inaccuracy in Traceroute–derived AS–level topologies

- anonymous routers
- unmapped Traceroute hops
- sibling ASes
- multiple origin ASes prefixes
- divergence between control and data paths
- Internet Exchange Points
- Third–party addresses
- ...
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- Third–party addresses
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Third-party Addresses impact

TP addresses may cause the inference of false AS-level links
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IP level trace: a - b - c
Third-party Addresses impact

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AS mapping:  AS1 - AS1 - AS3
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False AS-level link AS1 – AS3
Third-party Addresses impact

TP addresses may cause the inference of false AS-level links

- IP level trace: \( a - b - c \)
- AS mapping: \( AS1 - AS1 - AS3 \)
- False AS-level link \( AS1 - AS3 \)
- AS2 is totally invisible
Is an IP address discovered by Traceroute a Third-party address or is it part of the actual traversed path?

Hyun et al. (PAM’ 03)
- Assessing candidate TP addresses with heuristic methods based on IP to AS mapping
- TP addresses cannot be considered as a significant source of AS map distortion

Zhang et al. (JSAC’ 11)
- Pre-collected information about the topology
- TP addresses represent a huge obstruction towards the accuracy of Traceroute measurements and the last and most difficult cause of inaccuracy to be inferred
Exploiting the IP Pre-specified Timestamp (TS) Option (RFC791)
- allows to pre-specify in a single packet probe up to four IP addresses from which a timestamp is requested

Common router behaviors in Internet [1]
- Routers not managing the TS option
- Any-interface stamping routers
  - insert *all* the requested Timestamps when the pre-specified IPs are associated to *any* owned interface
- Per-interface stamping routers
  - insert a *single* Timestamp every time the packet passes through the interface associated to the pre-specified IP address

Identifying Third-Party addresses

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Let Y be
- an IP address discovered by Traceroute toward a destination D
- owned by a per-interface stamping router

Is Y a Third-party address or not?

- **Y is a third-party address!**
- Send UDP probe toward D prespecifying Y
  - Y provides a timestamp
  - Yes (Y is on the actual IP path!)
  - No
Identifying Third-Party addresses

| IP   | TSopt | b | UDP |

![Diagram showing network traffic and IP addresses](image_url)
Identifying Third-Party addresses

X - Timestamp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>TSopt</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Identifying Third-Party addresses

- Source
- R1
- R2
- R3
- Destination

IP
ICMP PU
IP
TSopt
UDP

X - Timestamp
Forward path
Interfaces on the actual IP path
Identifying Third-Party addresses

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Forward path

Interfaces on the actual IP path
UDP packet probes allow to avoid ambiguities caused by the reverse path.
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Identifying Third-Party addresses

- A preliminary step is necessary to state if Y is owned by a per-interface stamping router
  - Ping Y pre-specifying Y four times
  - Typically the TS option is replicated in the Ping Reply

- Y is considered non-classifiable when
  - It is not clear if the owning router manages the TS option
    - Y is a private address
    - Y does not reply to Ping
    - Y does not provide timestamps in the Ping Reply
    - The TS option is removed from Ping Reply
  - It is owned by an any-interface stamping router [1]
    - Y provides 4 timestamps in the Ping Reply

- Y is considered classifiable only when it provides at least 1 Timestamp but less than 4 Timestamps in the Ping Reply

Targeting 327K IPs in 14K distinct ASes showing stable responsiveness to
- Ping according to the PREDICT project
- UDP packet probes carrying the TS option

53 Planetlab nodes as vantage points located in distinct ASes performing
the following steps for each destination
1. trace the IP path with UDP paris-traceroute
2. classify each IP address discovered along the path

Final dataset
- removed traces containing loops or unable to reach the destination
- about 12M Traceroute traces and 443K Ips

Experimental results
- hop classifiability
- classification results
- impact on AS-level links and paths
- Comparison with the Hyun’s method
Hop classifiability

- The same IP address is captured by multiple VPs

+50% of IPs is observed by more than 35 VPs
Hop classifiability

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+50% of IPs is observed by more than 35 VPs

- The same IP address has been judged as classifiable or not by each vantage point

Classifiable IPs (51%)
Non-Classifiable IPs (47.6%)
Conflicting Verdicts (1.4%)
Hop classifiability

- Conflicting verdicts are mainly caused by filtering events
  - in-transit filtering of the Ping reply
  - removal of the TS option from the Ping reply

- Non-classifiable IPs breakdown

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>IPs (K)</th>
<th>IPs (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPs not replying to Ping</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPs not providing Timestamps</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any-interface stamping router</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPs providing a Ping Reply not containing the TS option</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private addresses</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>210</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.6</strong></td>
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Classification Results

- An IP address appears in several paths and each time it has been classified:
  - TP: IPs always classified as Third-party addresses
  - OnPath: IPs always classified as on the IP path
  - Mix: IPs classified sometimes as Third-party addresses sometimes on the path
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![Graph showing classification results]

Note: One SRC - Many DESTs
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Routers often replies by exploiting an interface different from those actually traversed toward the Traceroute destination!
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An address is a TP address or not depending on:

1. the originating host
2. the targeted destination
3. both of them!
Impact on AS-level links

- IP-to-AS mapping to extract AS-level links
  - not considering IXPs hops and links involving Sibling ASes, MOAS and unmapped hops

- An AS-level link may appear in several traces being determined by several distinct pairs of IP addresses
  - Not Affected AS link
    - at least once, both the involved IPs have been classified as on path
  - Potentially Not Affected AS link
    - at least once, both IPs have been labeled as non-classifiable
  - Affected AS link
    - always, at least one of the involved IPs has been classified as TP
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Total AS links: 34,414

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Third-party addresses affect a significant percentage of AS-level links!
About 587K traces normally reaching the destinations contain AS–level loops

- about 37% of the loops involve TP addresses
  - 105K loops start with a TP address
  - 149K loops end with a TP address
  - 6K loops contain consecutive TP addresses
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AS-level path: AS1 AS2 AS2 AS2 AS1
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AS–level path:  AS1  AS2  AS2  AS2  AS1

We never left AS1!
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Third-party addresses may be responsible for bogus AS–level loops.
Comparison with the Hyun’s method

“An intermediate address that resolves to an AS that differs from the ASes of both adjacent addresses in the same path is a candidate Third-party address”

Hyun et al. (PAM’03)

- Just 1.5% of the TP addresses identified by our technique is also detected by the Hyun’s method
  - a TP address is such independently from the AS point of view
  - an address is a TP address depending on the source and the destination
  - also a single AS–level transition may be affected by TP addresses
  - a Traceroute trace may contain multiple consecutive TP addresses
Summary

An active probing technique able to identify TP addresses in Traceroute traces
- exploiting the IP Pre-specified Timestamp Option
- no BGP information
- no pre-collected information about the topology

Main findings
- the same IP address is a Third-party address or not depending on the Traceroute originating host, the targeted destination, both of them
- routers often reply to Traceroute by exploiting an interface different from those actually traversed toward the Traceroute destination
- a significant percentage of Traceroute-derived AS-level links are affected by Third-party addresses
- Third-party addresses may be responsible for bogus AS-level loops

When Traceroute is used to infer the AS-level topology, TP addresses may represent a strong source of AS map distortion!
Many researchers believe that **IP options are not an option** (Fonseca et al. 2005)
- IP options expose packet probes to filtering policies
- IP options are not widely supported
- IP options are poorly implemented

Large scale experiments demonstrate how filtering actually depends on
- the type of packet probes (UDP, ICMP, TCP, …)
- the type of IP options (TS, RR, SSRR, …)
- the type of routers on the path

More and more active probing techniques based on IP options have been recently proposed
- Reverse Traceroute **(best paper, NSDI’10)**
- Alias resolution **(IMC’10)**
- Quantifying violations of destination–based forwarding **(IMC’12)**
- Detecting and locating Hidden routers **(GI’13)**
- Detecting Third–party addresses **(best poster, SIGCOMM’12)**
- Inferring router statistics **(CONEXT’10)**
- and more …

**IP options represent an amazing though limited tool for Internet measurements!**